

(1) The Generation of 'I' and 'the Self'

In the previous subsections, I have already discussed that the identity of a self with itself is the manifestation of the absolute identity of no form. For example, 'A is A' is a manifestation of absolute identity. In fact, human self-consciousness is also a manifestation of the identity of a self with itself. This identity of self-consciousness is a real identity (one that really possesses the three no form actions), whereas 'A is A' is an identity in the world of language, an identity that lacks real motive force action and manifestation action; it is a 'simulated' identity. Because the world of language is a 'pure' world of isolation. However, by understanding the identity of 'A is A', we can, in turn, be helped to understand the identity of the self.

Let us examine the 'I'. For the 'I', all things in consciousness are 'of the I'; they all belong to me, and consciousness is also my consciousness. And since all things in consciousness belong to consciousness, therefore, the 'I' also belongs to consciousness. The 'I' is not only the content in consciousness, but also the bearer of consciousness, and vice versa. This embodies the mutually dependent relationship between consciousness and the 'I'. Therefore, consciousness and the 'I' are things of the same level; they are two aspects of the same thing.

We first need to clarify two concepts: 'the self' and 'self-consciousness'. 'Self-consciousness' refers to the actual consciousness of the self, while 'the self' is the concept of self-consciousness, and the self belongs to the 'I'.

Viewing form from the perspective of no form:

- 1) Viewing form from the perspective of isolation, the 'I' is substance, thus being able to say 'what I am'; this is the 'I' of substance.
- 2) Viewing form from the perspective of motive force, the 'I' is subject, thus being able to say 'what I do'; this is the 'I' of the subject.
- 3) Viewing form from the perspective of manifestation, the essence of the 'I' is 'the identity of a self with itself', thus being able to say 'I am I'; this is the essential I, and the essential I is the self.

We see that the 'I' and consciousness have a close relationship. Let us first examine: how does human consciousness manifest its own identity, that is, how is self-consciousness formed. We must still return to no form action theory itself to explore this question. First, we must divide consciousness into three categories according to the content it manifests:

- 1) Consciousness of manifestation content: is the content that consciousness directly manifests, for example, the pure sensation of color (the sensation of red), the timbre of a sound, the sensation of pain, etc.
- 2) Consciousness of motive force content: consciousness manifests the content of the human body, emotional activities, or thought activities.
- 3) Consciousness of isolation content: consciousness manifests the content of linguistic concepts.

Human memory can be divided into sensory memory, short-term memory, and long-term memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). We humans can use memory to realize 'consciousness manifesting its own identity', thereby forming self-consciousness.

For the consciousness of manifestation content, when a person sees a thing, this thing, as manifested content, will enter memory. Not only that, but the consciousness at the time of seeing this thing will also be associated with this thing and be remembered (otherwise, we would not remember whether what we saw was seen by ourselves). We call the consciousness that is associated with this manifested content 'a'. When this consciousness ('a') enters sensory memory, the currently manifesting consciousness then has the opportunity to obtain consciousness 'a' from sensory memory (this is, in fact, a re-presentation of memory, which will be explained in detail later). In other words, the currently manifesting consciousness is then able to manifest 'a' as consciousness, thereby realizing consciousness's manifestation of the consciousness in memory. Since they are both the consciousness of the same person, this thus realizes 'consciousness manifesting its own identity', and thereby generates self-consciousness. This is the self-consciousness of manifestation content.

Since people have not found an actual object corresponding to the self, they sometimes confuse the difference between the self as a concept and the actual object corresponding to the self, and sometimes use them without distinction, which leads to confusion. We have now found the actual object corresponding to the self, which is 'the consciousness that manifests its own identity (self-consciousness)'. Therefore, we take the self as the concept for this kind of consciousness, to avoid confusion. Note, 'manifesting its own identity' and 'possessing its own identity' are not the same. Every thing that has isolation possesses identity, but it may not necessarily be able to manifest its own identity.

However, this self-consciousness is instantaneous; it can only be manifested and felt at the moment the person is viewing the thing. In this way, this self-consciousness is also vague and weak, even for an adult. Unless under certain circumstances the consciousness associated with this manifested content is very distinct (for example, if the thing being viewed is very shocking or impressive), only then can a slightly more distinct self-consciousness be formed. If the manifested content of this thing enters short-term memory or long-term memory, then the duration and intensity of the self-consciousness formed will be somewhat enhanced, because consciousness 'a' can be stored more stably.

However, since both consciousness 'a' and the currently manifesting consciousness are the consciousness of manifestation content, these two consciousnesses are too homogeneous. Therefore, it is very difficult to distinguish that associated consciousness 'a', and the feeling of self-consciousness is therefore not very distinct. This self-consciousness is also a self-consciousness that is associated with the content of a specific thing (of course, it is not as clear as a linguistic concept, because the latter has clearer boundaries and meanings); it requires a specific thing to be realized. This point also makes this self-consciousness vague. This self-consciousness based on manifestation content is a natural, non-conceptual self-experience.

When an infant can see this world, in their eyes, the world they see is their world; it is the world they possess. The things they see are theirs, and they and this world are one (James, 1890). The world the infant sees is directly manifested, and the boundary between 'self' and 'world' is not distinguished. Instead, there is a direct experience of the feeling that 'the world is one's own'. At this time, the infant only has the self-consciousness of manifestation content.

As this infant continuously interacts with the external world, using their own body to act or to

change certain things, they will then discover that there are some things that they cannot change. This discovery causes them to begin to realize that some things do not belong to them, which leads to their having an initial distinction between 'self' and 'external things'. This experience does not depend on language, but on their concrete actions and feedback in the interaction. This consciousness of motive force content is different from the previous consciousness of manifestation content; it is a consciousness caused by the infant's own activity. Their motive force content and the consciousness related to the motive force content will enter sensory memory, and like the consciousness of manifestation content, will generate self-consciousness. This is the self-consciousness of motive force content.

However, the self-consciousness generated by this consciousness of motive force content is clearer than the self-consciousness generated by the consciousness of manifestation content. This is because the consciousness of motive force content is very different from the consciousness of manifestation content; it not only contains manifestation content, but also involves a behavioral motivation and a self-initiated activity. It has greater clarity and subjectivity.

But this self-consciousness is also a primary form of self-consciousness. Even many advanced animals have this kind of self-consciousness. For example, some animals can recognize that the animal in the mirror is themselves (e.g., dolphins and great apes) (Gallup, 1970). This recognition is also achieved by the animal continuously making various movements in front of the mirror. For another example, some pet dogs can perform for their owners things they have done in the past. This clearly shows that they have this self-consciousness of motive force content. This is the dog using the activity of its own body to express things it has done in the past, and at the same time, it is also expressing self-consciousness.

This self-consciousness is not a self-consciousness on the level of linguistic concepts; it is a self-consciousness based on concrete activity, the self-consciousness of concrete activity. Therefore, it can be said that this self-consciousness is inflexible, not easily transferred to new situations, and requires concrete activity to be realized. The formation of this self-consciousness depends on the direct experience of bodily activity and is difficult to achieve through purely internal thought or abstract concepts. Therefore, this self-consciousness can usually only be embodied in relatively concrete situations and cannot be freely applied to abstract problems or complex reasoning.

As this infant continues to grow, their language also continuously develops, and linguistic symbols appear in consciousness. Linguistic symbols are flexible; one does not need to recall a certain complex thing or one's own activity to be able to easily use these symbols. In the process of an infant's growth, parents will continuously call their name. Such a name will also be stored in memory along with the consciousness at the time of hearing the name. At first, it is stored in sensory memory. As the parents continuously repeat it, this name will be stored in short-term memory, and finally in long-term memory. This is also a consciousness of manifestation content. When the name is heard again, it will also be manifested as a weak self-consciousness; this is the self-consciousness of manifestation content. However, as the adults continuously repeat it, this self-consciousness will also be strengthened.

More importantly, when the parents call their name, they will give them some confirmation, for instance, by feeding them, giving them a toy, having them do some actions, and so on. Parents

strengthen the association between the name and the infant through some concrete interactive behaviors. This interaction involves the self-consciousness of motive force content. When the infant hears the name, they not only remember the sound symbol, but also establish a connection with the name through responsive actions (such as turning their head, moving closer). The parents call out and give positive feedback, which allows the infant, through bodily activity, to gradually realize that 'this name refers to myself'. In this process, the infant's cognition of the name gradually develops from a cognition of manifestation content to a cognition of motive force content, because they gradually experience the direct connection between the name and themselves through activity. This is, in fact, using motive force content to form a self-consciousness of motive force content to strengthen their self-consciousness. In fact, a pet dog can also do this; when the owner calls the dog's name, the dog will come over.

The infant is able to recognize themselves through the name and can experience self-consciousness without needing to recall specific things or activities. The flexibility of language makes this self-consciousness more generalized and abstract. It no longer depends on specific situations or action feedback, but can be evoked in any situation where the name is heard or they are mentioned. The name, as a stable linguistic symbol, enables the infant to form a consistent self-consciousness in different situations (Vygotsky, 1978).

However, the difference between a human and a dog lies in the fact that a human can use their own name for communication. When this infant reaches early childhood and can speak, at first, they will not use 'I' to express themselves, but will use their name (or omit their name) and will also need to supplement this with some actions, for example, 'Jack wants a toy'. All of this shows that both the self-consciousness of manifestation content and the self-consciousness of motive force content are at play. But the self-consciousness at this time is still linked to specific experiences and activities.

With continuous communication, a specific person's name also appears complex and needs to be simplified to the point where it cannot be simplified any further. For that, the pronoun 'I' must be used. A person's name already points to the person themselves, so why does it still need to be simplified to 'I'? This shows that a person's name cannot represent 'self-consciousness'; that 'self-consciousness' is only associated with the person's name, and only when a person recalls the specific name will self-consciousness be generated. Such a simplification, in fact, separates 'self-consciousness' from the person's name, although they are also related. After this simplification and separation from the name, self-consciousness is no longer attached to a specific symbol. Self-consciousness gradually detaches from specific experiences and activities and develops into an abstract, stable conceptual entity (the self). This represents a shift from a third-person perspective ('the name') to a first-person perspective. This is something animals cannot do, because they do not have a language system.

However, at this stage, the young child's primary focus is not on the self (the essential I) and the 'I' of substance, but on the 'subject I': what I can get, what I do, and so on. At this point, the concept of 'I' is relatively direct and experiential, representing an operational subject. The self-consciousness at this time is still closely linked to their actions and experiences. At this stage, they do not yet have the capacity for reflection, and the concepts of the 'I' of substance and the self require reflection to be obtained. That is, there is a transition from 'what I do' to 'what I am',

and then to 'I am I'.

At this point, the self truly becomes the self ('I am I'). That is, we use the linguistic concept 'the self' to express that real self-consciousness, and the real self-consciousness becomes the self as a concept. We see that the concept of 'I' is generated before 'the self'. This is because, compared to the self, the concept of 'I' is easier to generate as it does not require reflection. This evolutionary path illustrates the process by which self-consciousness gradually moves from a concrete, passive, and experiential association to the abstract and independent concept of 'the self'.

Only in self-consciousness does consciousness enable us to form the concept of 'I'. Otherwise, consciousness is merely a simple manifestation; consciousness itself would not manifest as 'I' at all. Consciousness does not necessarily recognize itself as an 'I'; consciousness does not automatically acknowledge itself as an 'I'. It is precisely the appearance of self-consciousness, as the manifestation of the identity of consciousness, that makes the concept of 'I' possible.

From a linguistic perspective, it is precisely because of the existence of linguistic concepts that consciousness, in self-consciousness, is labeled as a concept in language and thus becomes the 'I' as a concept. That is to say, in self-consciousness, without considering the identity of self-consciousness, this consciousness is 'I'. 'I' is the concept of consciousness as simple self-consciousness; it is the direct reference to consciousness. After the concept of 'I' exists, 'I' can then be used independently. Most importantly, 'I' can be used freely, which allows for abstract thought, planning, and self-reflection.

The difference between 'I' and 'the self' is: the self is the essential I. Without self-consciousness, there is no concept of 'I', because 'I' originates from consciousness's direct confirmation of itself. 'I', on the other hand, refers to the consciousness that can either manifest its identity or not manifest its own identity. A person being 'conscious' is not necessarily self-conscious. For example, when a person is thinking about a problem, at that time they are conscious; they are consciously thinking about the problem. But it cannot be said that at that time they have self-consciousness. The 'I' as a concept refers to the consciousness in 'they are consciously thinking about the problem'. Therefore, the actual consciousness referred to by 'the self' is more concrete than the actual consciousness referred to by 'I'. Consequently, 'I' as a concept is more basic than the self as a concept. That is, the self belongs to 'I'. Just as a real human is more concrete than a real animal, but as a concept, 'animal' is more basic than 'human'.

After having the concept of 'I', one needs to go through reflection to obtain the concept of the self. For example, 'I am a good person' (the 'I' of substance). Through reflection (the subject I), one will obtain 'this attribute of being a good person is mine'. Such a reflection will strengthen the identity of 'I am I'. Reflection becomes the key process in the formation of the concept of 'the self', which makes the 'I' no longer just a simple reference, but a self that has the attribute of 'self' and identity; this is the 'essential I'. In this situation, self-consciousness both contains the manifestation function of consciousness itself, and also, through the confirmation of 'I am I', realizes a further deepening of subjectivity, which makes the 'I' not just a symbol in consciousness, but a complete individual that possesses the attribute of 'self'.

When self-consciousness is manifested in consciousness through the identity of 'I am I' (that is, through this reflection), it causes the 'I' to point to the 'I', thereby generating the concept of the

self. When consciousness possesses identity, it becomes self-consciousness, and at the same time, self-consciousness is also consciousness. At this point, the self is 'I am I'; the self is I, and I am the self. In other words, at this moment, the essential I (the self), the 'I' of substance, and the subject I become a no form trinity.

Having examined the 'I' from the perspective of no form viewing form earlier and having clarified the concept of the 'I', let us now examine the 'I' by viewing no form from the perspective of form:

1) Viewing Being from the Perspective of Form: All the content in consciousness is, in fact, expressed as a kind of consciousness. Since 'I' refers to consciousness, the content in consciousness, as consciousness, is 'I'. In this way, 'I' becomes the ground of the content of consciousness; that is, all the content of consciousness is 'I'; it all belongs to me. The 'I' itself, as substance, is also its own ground, having an independent being.

2) Viewing Freedom from the Perspective of Form: 'I' is also the cause of all consciousness. All the content of consciousness is generated by 'I'; all the content generated by 'I' becomes my content. The 'I' itself, as a subject, is also its own cause.

3) Viewing Transparency from the Perspective of Form: 'I' possesses opening. It is the opening of the essence of its own identity, and it is manifested transparently. The 'I' itself opens its own essence.

The foundation of the 'I of substance' (what I am) is 'I as ground'; the foundation of the 'subject I' (what I do) is 'I as cause'; the foundation of the 'essential I' (I am) is 'I as opening'. The analysis from these two different perspectives ultimately points to the same multidimensional, unified 'I'.

Through reflection, the self is continuously strengthened, and the concept of the self becomes clearer and more stable. As the self is strengthened, self-consciousness is also strengthened. As our self-consciousness is continuously strengthened, when the actual experience of self-consciousness in a person's consciousness is very clear and determinate, self-consciousness will also be determinately remembered and stored. This process of memorization endows self-consciousness with a form of being that is independent of current activity. In this way, our brain can directly manifest this stored self-consciousness through memory. Thus, without depending on any experience or activity, one can directly, through 'the self' as a concept, obtain the real experience of self-consciousness, thereby realizing a conceptual, immediate manifestation. For example, when we think of the concept of 'the self', we will directly, in the memory of the brain, obtain the real experience of self-consciousness.

On the basis of this memorization, self-consciousness is not just a condition of consciousness, but becomes an independently existing substance. Although 'I' is generally used as a subject and a substance, with a person's activities and thoughts, and the interaction between them, the relationship among the subject I, the essential I, and the 'I' of substance becomes closer and closer. When we think of 'I', we sometimes also obtain the real experience of self-consciousness.

We see that in the process of the realization of self-consciousness, the role of the 'symbol' is present from beginning to end: a concrete thing as a symbol, the activity of the human body as a symbol, and a person's name as a symbol. In the process of the realization of the self, these symbols all exhibit the phenomenon of identity. That is, when we extract the symbol from

memory into consciousness as a real thing, the thing in memory and the real thing are unified into the same thing. At the same time, consciousness also achieves identity and becomes self-consciousness. Although the self is ultimately separated out, self-consciousness (the present consciousness manifesting the consciousness in memory), in order to be expressed, still requires a linguistic symbol: 'I am I' (where 'am' means manifestation). 'I am I' is the identity of self-consciousness expressed through the means of linguistic symbols. 'I am I' is the form of self-consciousness, and this form is the essence of self-consciousness.

In other words, language enables the essence of this identity of self-consciousness to be expressed. Although self-consciousness can exist as an experience, it is only after it has been transformed through language into the form of 'I am I' that consciousness truly realizes a definite confirmation of itself. This process makes consciousness not just a flowing phenomenon, but also a being that can be fixedly known. Thus, self-consciousness becomes a recognizable, concrete being in consciousness. Language is not only the tool for expressing self-consciousness, but also the key means by which its essence is manifested. Although other animals may have a certain self-consciousness, they have not achieved this.

For the subject I, it can be expressed as: 'what I do'. For the 'I' of substance, it can be expressed as: 'what I am'. For the essential I, it can be expressed as: 'I am I' (this is also an 'A is A' type of identity). In other words, in essence, self-consciousness is linguistic (it needs language to express its essence). However, due to the existence of the three real no form actions, our consciousness can not only directly manifest this essence of 'I am I', but can also directly transform it into actual self-consciousness. But it cannot manifest other 'A is A's; it can only manifest the understanding of 'A is A' as a linguistic symbol. That is to say, other instances of 'A is A' are still conceptual understandings in the world of language, lacking the direct experiential reality of self-consciousness.

And only the self, as 'the identity of a self with itself', can be truly manifested. In other words, the self is the only instance of 'A is A' that can be truly manifested. This is the relationship and difference between the self and 'A is A'. The self, in its essence, is both of a linguistic structural form and can be manifested as a real substance. This dual attribute gives the self a unique position in human experience, thereby making the self a unique manifestation in consciousness that is both conceptual and real. In other words, this dual attribute allows self-consciousness to not only manifest the identity of consciousness (direct perception), but also allows consciousness to manifest this identity as its essence ('I am I'). This relationship between self-consciousness and symbolic structure also shows the self as a unique bridge between language and real manifestation.

For a person, any concept is a concept 'of the I'; it is a concept formed through the 'I'; it is a concept that is understood, mastered, and can be used by the 'I'. The 'I', as the center of the conceptual system, is not only the source of all concepts, but also their final point of convergence. Every concept is understood, mastered, and operated upon through the 'I', which makes the 'I' truly the subject in cognitive activity.

In fact, to be precise, the content of the 'I' should be 'the content that I generate', 'the content that I master', and 'the content that I operate on'. All this content can be associated with the consciousness that manifests it, and can thereby be associated with the concept 'I', which is the

consciousness as self-consciousness. Therefore, it is said that it is only after the 'I' is associated with this content that it truly acquires formal content, and thereby acquires substantiality, and can then say: 'what I am'. This is, in fact, to say that the subject I has acquired formal content. Viewed from the perspective of substance, it is transformed into the content of substance; it becomes the content of the 'I' of substance.

We see that the combination of self-consciousness and language generates the concept of 'I', which in turn generates a 'world of my own'. In this world, everything is mine. However, at the initial generation of the 'I', the 'I' is a concept without any formal content. It is only in the continuous various interactions of a person that the 'I' becomes enriched.

(2) The Self and Identity

The identity of the self discussed earlier refers to a singular identity. In that case, there would be different self-consciousnesses and different selves at different times, and their strength could also be different. The self at any point in time could be regarded as an independent 'I'. This would mean that there exist multiple separate 'selves' at different times. So why are these selves from different periods considered to be the same self? Moreover, a person's body, brain, cognition, and experience are constantly changing throughout their life as they age. So why does our consciousness still consider the present self to be the same self as the one from childhood? In other words, why does the self possess a continuous identity over time?

We have already discussed earlier that self-consciousness can be stored as memory and can be retrieved from memory and re-presented when necessary. This does indeed increase the consistency of self-consciousness. But we can still ask: why is this re-presented self-consciousness from memory my self-consciousness? It is merely a self of the past. This is still a problem like a labyrinth. The linguistic expression of the self or 'I am I' can also increase the consistency of the self at different times. However, the self is not just a linguistic identity, but also an identity of the actual experience of self-consciousness. The linguistic structure 'I am I' only shows that the self-consciousness of different periods has the same essential formal structure. There are many things with the same formal structure (for example, electrons), but we cannot say that they are identical. Therefore, linguistic identity cannot fully explain the problem of the identity of the self over time.

We know that a person's recollection of memory is a re-presentation; it is the re-presenting in consciousness of content that existed in memory in the past. At the same time, the past consciousness will also be re-presented. However, this consciousness that is re-presenting past content is still the present consciousness, not the past consciousness; it is not that the past consciousness is taken out of memory. In this way, when a person is recalling the past, for the identity of consciousness, it is the use of the present consciousness to simulate a past consciousness, and the use of the present consciousness to manifest this simulated consciousness, thereby generating the identity of consciousness. This simulated consciousness can be identified as a past consciousness only because it is a recollection.

In this way, the same present consciousness is distinguished into two different layers: the purely present consciousness and the simulated consciousness of recollection. This makes it possible for the present consciousness to manifest its own identity. In other words, no matter when we recall

the past, and no matter which past we recall, our simulated consciousness of recollection is always of the present. The identity of consciousness that is thereby generated is also of the present, and the self-consciousness generated is also of the present. This is to say that self-consciousness and the self are always of the present. This explains why the self of a person from different periods is considered to be the same self. The self of different periods is unified on the dimension of 'the now' and thereby acquires its identity. Therefore, it is said that the self acquires its temporal continuity on the dimension of 'the now'. This brings about an unfold-manifestation of the unifying action of the dimension of 'the now'. By manifesting different things on this dimension of 'the now', it unifies them, and they thereby acquire a temporal identity.

In reality, when we have done something or have come to know 'what I am' (for instance, 'I am a good person'), the sense of self is strengthened. Why?

Below, let us see if the essential I, the subject I, and the 'I' of substance constitute a no form integrated transformation:

1) The transformation of the 'I' of substance into the essential I requires the subject I: When I come to know 'I am a good person', then this attribute of 'being a good person' is mine. In this way, a pattern of reflection is formed: 'I am a good person', and 'being a good person' as an attribute is mine. Such a 'what I am' and 'what is mine' is, in fact, strengthening: 'I am I'. And 'I am I' is the essence of the self. Therefore, the confirmation of a substance such as 'what I am' will strengthen the sense of self. This is to say that the 'I' of substance can be transformed into the essential I ('I am I'). However, in this process, a kind of thinking such as reflection is used. This is something that is done by the subject I. In other words, the transformation of the 'I' of substance into the essential I requires the subject I.

2) The transformation of the subject I into the essential I requires the 'I' of substance: When I have solved a difficult math problem, I am the cause of the solution to this problem. Then, this problem was solved by me. This also forms a pattern of reflection: 'I solved a difficult math problem', from which one can reflect, 'this problem was solved by me'. Therefore, the confirmation of a subject such as 'what I do' will likewise strengthen the sense of self. This is to say that the subject I can be transformed into the essential I ('I am I'). We see that in this transformation process, we find that we need the 'I' as substance, because the opposite expression of 'this problem was solved by me' is the expression of the 'I' as substance: 'I am the person who solved this problem'.

3) The transformation of the subject I into the 'I' of substance requires the essential I: The 'I' in the subject I and the 'I' of substance are not naturally completely the same, nor will they automatically become completely the same. When we make a decision to do something, it is often due to the impulse of motive force that we lose the 'I' of substance, which then overrides the understanding that the 'I' of substance has of my own abilities or limitations. The 'I' of substance may also underestimate or overestimate the capacity for action of the subject I. In this way, the subject I and the 'I' of substance will have an interactivity; they will be able to mutually influence and shape each other. The ultimate goal of such an interactivity is to take the essential 'I' of 'I am I' as the target. Under such a goal, the two 'I's will form a coherent, coordinated, and unified essential I. In other words, when they are united, they will be transformed into the

essential I. Therefore, the essential I is not merely the result of the interaction between the subject and the substance self, but is, moreover, the guiding principle and goal throughout the transformation process.

4) In 3), it is already contained that the transformation of the 'I' of substance into the subject I requires the essential I.

5) The transformation of the essential I into the 'I' of substance requires the subject I: 'I am I', as the essential 'I', is the core of this self-identity. But for it to possess real, existing content, it needs to be embodied through the 'I' of substance. This transformation requires the subject I to provide the motive force and content, to make the essential I concrete into the 'I' of substance. This is the transformation of the essential I into the 'I' of substance, which requires the subject I.

6) The transformation of the essential I into the subject I requires the 'I' of substance: When the essential I, as an intrinsic identity and self-cognition, is to become the leader of action, it needs to be transformed into the subject I. To realize this transformation, the 'I' of substance is required as a real support, to give the essential I the possibility of being realistically operable. This is the transformation of the essential I into the subject I, which requires the 'I' of substance.

These discussions of the essential I (manifestation action), the 'I' of substance (isolation action), and the subject I (motive force action) have already clarified that these three 'I's can constitute a no form integrated transformation. This shows that the three 'I's can be mutually transformed, possess a dynamic unity, and the relationship among them is one of mutual dependence and indivisibility.

Actual self-consciousness is manifestation action; it is the manifested self. Whereas the self as its essence ('I am I') is linguistic. Therefore, the self is isolation action; it is the isolated self. We can surmise that there should also be a motive force self. I believe this motive force self is the 'I' that was discussed earlier, the one that reflects on the 'I'; that is, the reflective self. For example, when I do something, it is I who is doing this thing.

The formation of the concept of the self from 'self-consciousness' is completed through the reflective self (the motive force self). This is a no form united transformation. The manifested self as direct experience, the isolated self as linguistic confirmation, and the motive force self as a mechanism for reflection and impetus, in a no form united transformation, not only bring about an unfold-manifestation of their own unique actions, but also embody how the three work together in the dynamic construction of the self. Conversely, the formation of the isolated self has allowed us to understand the essence of consciousness.

Finally, let us use the theory of 'the self' that we have formed to explain a few difficult problems:

1) The Paradox of the Ship of Theseus

This classic thought experiment illustrates the difficulty of defining identity over time. If all the planks of a ship are gradually replaced, is it still the same ship? Likewise, if all the cells in our body are replaced over time, are we still the same person? This paradox highlights the tension between change and permanence.

Analysis: Since all the cells in our body are replaced over time, from an objective perspective, we

are certainly no longer the same person. But from the perspective of the self, as long as we have not lost our memory, since self-consciousness exists in the dimension of 'the now', our self-consciousness will always think: I am still myself.

2) The Fission and Fusion Problem:

Thought experiments involving the splitting (fission) or merging (fusion) of minds further complicate this problem. If a person's mind is split into two independent entities, are there now two different people, or does the original person in some way continue to exist in both? These scenarios challenge the traditional notion of personal identity as single and indivisible.

Analysis: Similarly, since self-consciousness exists in the dimension of 'the now', if a person's mind is split into two independent entities, becoming two different people, then these two people will each have their own self. If two people merge and become one person, then this person will also only have one self.

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